Texas A&M Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 2

February 2020

Subsurface Tension: The Conflicting Laws of Texas and New
Mexico Over Shared Groundwater and New Mexico’s Desire for
Regulation
Kameron B. Smith
Texas A&M University School of Law, kbs1@tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Water Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kameron B. Smith, Subsurface Tension: The Conflicting Laws of Texas and New Mexico Over Shared
Groundwater and New Mexico’s Desire for Regulation, 7 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 453 (2020).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V7.I2.5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information,
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

SUBSURFACE TENSION: THE CONFLICTING
LAWS OF TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO
OVER SHARED GROUNDWATER
AND NEW MEXICO’S DESIRE
FOR REGULATION
By: Kameron B. Smith*
ABSTRACT
A recent oil boom in Southern New Mexico has resulted in increased hydraulic fracturing operations in the region and, as a result, a steady and reliable supply of water to fuel such operations is required. As New Mexico
regulations make it difficult to acquire a steady supply of water within the
state, oil and natural gas producers are turning to unregulated areas in Texas,
which permit unlimited pumping of groundwater. However, this groundwater
is being pumped from the Pecos Valley aquifer, which is the same source of
water that New Mexico is regulating within its borders. This issue is only one
in a series of interstate water feuds between the two states. This Comment identifies the current practice of groundwater imports from Texas into New Mexico and the methods New Mexico might employ to limit or prevent such
imports. Additionally, this Comment discusses an interstate compact as an alternative to New Mexico attempting to regulate water imports, which would
undoubtedly lead to extensive litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a June 5, 2018 press release, Houston-based water supply company Solaris Water Midstream, LLC (“Solaris”) announced that it had
acquired the New Mexico water supply corporation, Vision Resources, Inc.1 The purpose of the acquisition was to add to Solaris’s
existing Pecos Star System, which is a significant source of water for
oil and natural gas producers in the Permian Basin.2 In addition, Solaris announced that it is constructing a new water supply line to provide a “crucial [and] permanent water supply infrastructure” for
hydraulic fracturing operations that have been constrained by limited
sources of water in southern New Mexico.3
However, water supply for hydraulic fracturing operations is limited
in southern New Mexico not only by nature, but also by the state’s
imposition of tight regulations on its groundwater.4 In contrast, pumping groundwater under areas in Texas that are not within a Groundwater Conservation District (“GCD”) is not regulated and is subject
only to the rule of capture.5 As a result, Solaris’s new line will be able
to transport approximately 6.3 million gallons of water per day from
Loving County, Texas to Eddy County, New Mexico to support hydraulic fracturing operations that have been burdened by New Mexico’s regulations.6 Although gaining access to the Pecos Valley aquifer
in New Mexico is difficult, securing groundwater rights in Loving
County, Texas provides companies like Solaris virtually unlimited access to the same aquifer,7 as Loving County is not subject to the regulations of a GCD.8
1. Solaris Water Midstream Acquires New Mexico Water Supply Business from
Vision Resources, Inc. and Launches Major Expansion in the Delaware Basin, SOLARIS WATER MIDSTREAM (June 5, 2018, 9:30 AM EDT), http://www.solarismid
stream.com/news/solaris-water-midstream-acquires-new-mexico-water-supply-busi
ness-vision-resources-inc-and [https://perma.cc/8FFZ-PWY5].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Matt Weiser, Oil Boom in Southern New Mexico Ignites Groundwater Feud
with Texas, WATER DEEPLY (July 16, 2018), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/arti
cles/2018/07/16/oil-boom-in-southern-new-mexico-ignites-groundwater-feud-withtexas [https://perma.cc/V229-GDSF].
5. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. 2012).
6. Weiser, supra note 4.
7. Id.; see also Edwards, 369 S.W.3d at 832.
8. Groundwater Conservation Districts of Texas, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD
(Dec. 2017), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/mapping/doc/maps/GCDs_8x11.pdf?d=28535
.000000003492 [https://perma.cc/2DN2-VDA9] [hereinafter GCD Map].
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With reports of giants such as ConocoPhillips and Texas Pacific
Land Trust also piping water from Texas into New Mexico, it is clear
that Solaris is not alone in capitalizing on the sharp distinctions between the two states’ groundwater regulations.9 In addition, water use
for hydraulic fracturing operations is projected to substantially increase over the next decade,10 and pumping water to support such operations could have a substantial localized effect on water availability
in arid regions such as the Permian Basin.11
As a result, New Mexico is concerned that unregulated pumping in
Texas will ultimately deplete its access to the aquifer.12 Therefore,
companies using the lack of regulation in Texas to circumvent New
Mexico’s regulation of the same aquifer has resulted in tension between state officials.13 Aubrey Dunn, the New Mexico land commissioner, has gone as far as accusing Texas of stealing New Mexico’s
water by allowing companies to sidestep New Mexico’s regulation of
the aquifer, essentially “sucking all the water from under New Mexico
out in Texas and then selling it back to New Mexico.”14
Meanwhile, Texas and New Mexico are already involved in litigation whereby Texas alleges New Mexico has violated the Rio Grande
Compact of 1938.15 The Compact requires Colorado to deliver a specified amount of water to the New Mexico state line annually.16 However, rather than New Mexico delivering a specified amount of water
to the Texas state line, the Compact requires delivery to the Elephant
Butte Reservoir, which is more than 100 miles inside New Mexico.17
Initially, Texas was content with this agreement because the federal
government promised to provide a certain amount of water from the
Reservoir to Texas every year.18 However, Texas now alleges that
New Mexico is “allowing downstream New Mexico users to siphon off
water below the Reservoir in ways the Downstream Contracts do not
anticipate.”19 In other words, Texas claims that New Mexico’s failure
9. See Jay Root, New Mexico Official Says Texas Landowners Are “Stealing” Millions of Gallons of Water and Selling it Back for Fracking, TEX. TRIBUNE (June 7,
2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/07/texas-landowners-newmexico-stealing-water-fracking [https://perma.cc/R9XK-596F].
10. Andrew J. Kondash et al., The Intensification of the Water Footprint of Hydraulic Fracturing, SCI. ADVANCES, Aug. 2018, at 1–8, https://advances.sciencemag
.org/content/4/8/eaar5982 [https://perma.cc/G3AJ-BRBN].
11. See Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Will Water Scarcity in Semiarid Regions Limit
Hydraulic Fracturing of Shale Plays? , 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, no. 12, 2014, https://
iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/12/124011/meta [https://perma.cc/
FS8A-PB2L].
12. Weiser, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Root, supra note 9.
15. Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 957–58 (2018).
16. Id. at 957.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 958.
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to regulate the water within its borders is harming Texas’s water supply from the shared resource.
This Comment shows that the similar complaints Texas and New
Mexico have against each other can be resolved through an interstate
compact that will produce results that both states desire, without
spending years in the court system. Such an agreement could call for
amending the Rio Grande Compact of 1938 to better protect Texas’s
water supply and for the establishment of GCDs and management
plans in currently unregulated areas along the Texas–New Mexico
border to regulate the frequency and amount of water imported into
New Mexico. Part II of this Comment provides an exposition of both
Texas and New Mexico groundwater law and the institutions the two
states use to regulate groundwater. Part III identifies how although
unregulated Texas areas can soothe New Mexico’s concerns through
management plans, such regulation is unlikely to occur—without
something in exchange—as a result of the economic benefit that Texas
landowners are receiving from the lack of regulation. Part III also discusses what action New Mexico might take if Texas refuses to regulate
pumping from the Pecos Valley aquifer, including how New Mexico
could attempt to control unregulated pumping through regulating the
importation or usage of the water. It further discusses the litigation
that would undoubtedly occur from this course of action, the evidence
New Mexico would need to present to withstand a constitutional challenge, and the likelihood that such regulations would ultimately be
struck down. Lastly, Part IV explains how both states’ complaints
could be resolved through an interstate compact, with Texas agreeing
to regulate the amount and frequency of water exports into New Mexico, and New Mexico agreeing to ensure Texas receives a certain
amount of water from the Rio Grande. In connection with this proposed agreement, Part IV also discusses how Texas regulation of
water exports could be barred by federal power to regulate interstate
commerce and provides examples where this argument was raised but
failed with respect to management plans.
II. A HISTORY

OF

GROUNDWATER LAW
NEW MEXICO

IN

TEXAS

AND

West Texas and southeastern New Mexico are essentially identical
in climate, meaning the environmental issues the two areas face, including the need for groundwater conservation, are similar.20 Despite
having similar issues, the two states’ methods of groundwater regulation are at odds, with New Mexico following a plan of centralized reg20. See, e.g., West Texas/Southeastern New Mexico November 2017 Climate Summary, U.S. NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/media/maf/climate/sum
maries/November2017ClimateReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
94Q8-8WRS].
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ulation21 as opposed to Texas’s decentralized regulation in the form of
local districts.22 However, some areas in Texas along the New Mexico
border are not under the control of a GCD, and thus, are subject only
to the rule of capture.23 Consequently, these areas provide an attractive opportunity to hydraulic fracturing operations in southeastern
New Mexico, as they allow producers to avoid pumping regulations
entirely.24 In order to highlight why this practice is occurring and to
provide a foundation for a discussion of what can be done in response,
this Section compares the current state of groundwater law in Texas
and New Mexico.
A. Texas Groundwater Law
Despite groundwater’s close ties to the Texas economy, and the issues that arise from demand exceeding supply, such as overdrafting
from the aquifers, Texas has been slow to establish more than minimal
regulation of the resource.25 Although scarcity requires regulation
through allocation and management, such regulation is at odds with
the state’s treatment of groundwater as a private property right.26
While the Texas Legislature ultimately adopted a form of decentralized regulation by deferring regulation to local GCDs, such regulation
is only encouraged, not required.27 As a result, the default rule in the
state is that landowners own the groundwater below the surface of
their land and may “drill for and produce the groundwater below the
surface,” subject only to “common law defenses or other defenses to
liability under the rule of capture.”28 As “[t]he Texas legislature has
never modified or replaced the rule of capture,”29 it remains the rule
of law in areas without a GCD.30 This Section explains the rule of
capture as it relates to groundwater in the state and how the rule can
be limited by the establishment of GCDs and management plans.

21. See State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983, 987 (N.M. 1957).
22. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101.
23. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a)–(b-1)(2).
24. Weiser, supra note 4.
25. Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the
Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 249, 251 (2001).
26. Id.
27. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015(b).
28. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a)–(b-1)(2).
29. Susan B. Snyder & Jordan A. Rodriguez, Water Availability and Use Issues—Is
Water the New Oil? , 36 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 1016, 1032 (2015) [https://perma.cc/
T229-2SWE].
30. See RONALD A. KAISER, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS WATER LAW: PROBLEMS AND
NEEDS 32–33 (2002), https://texaswater.tamu.edu/resources/2002-037_waterlaw.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6R4D-5DKS].
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1. The Rule of Capture
The Texas Supreme Court first applied the rule of capture to
groundwater in Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East.31 In that case,
the Houston & Texas Railway Company (“Houston”) dug a well
twenty feet in diameter and sixty-six feet deep on land it owned to
access water percolating through the land’s soil.32 Houston dug the
well without any intention of injuring the neighboring property of W.
A. East (“East”).33 However, East’s well, which was only about five
feet in diameter and thirty-three feet deep, dried up as a result of
Houston’s well.34 The court found that the surface owner is entitled to
make “reasonable and legitimate use of the water . . . from its own
land” and that no liability arises from exhaustion resulting from
pumping the water for such uses, “whatever may be [the] effect upon
his neighbor’s wells and springs.”35 As a result, Houston was within its
rights to build a larger pump than its neighbor, East, and ultimately
restrict East’s access to the water under his own land.36 This unavoidable consequence of the rule of capture has led to an alternative name
for the rule: the “law of the biggest pump.”37
Whereas many states have modified the rule of capture by adopting
a criterion of reasonable use in resolving conflicts between competing
landowners, Texas has not made any such modification and unanimously re-affirmed the standard rule of capture in Sipriano v. Great
Spring Waters of America, Inc.38 In Sipriano, the plaintiffs, landowners
in Henderson County, Texas, sued Great Spring Waters of America,
Inc., a/k/a Ozarka Natural Spring Water Co. (“Ozarka”), for negligently draining their water wells as a result of Ozarka pumping
roughly 90,000 gallons of water a day from nearby land.39 Plaintiffs
argued that Texas should abandon the traditional rule of capture and
modify it to include the requirement of reasonable use.40 In response
to the plaintiffs, the court provided a history of its groundwater jurisprudence, highlighting instances where the court had recognized exceptions to the standard rule of capture but continually upheld it
without modification.41 Such exceptions include that a “[land]owner
may not maliciously take water for the sole purpose of injuring his
31. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 281–82.
36. See id.
37. Dylan O. Drummond et al., The Rule of Capture in Texas—Still So Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004).
38. Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 25, at 264.
39. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75–76 (Tex. 1999).
40. Id. at 76.
41. Id. at 77–79.
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neighbor, or wantonly and willfully waste it,”42 and that landowners
can be held liable when their negligence is a proximate cause of the
subsidence of another’s land.43 Outside of these exceptions, the Sipriano court, quoting Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District, refused to modify the standard rule, finding that
“water regulation is essentially a legislative function.”44 Therefore,
any limitation or modification of the standard rule must be done
through GCDs, the state’s preferred method of groundwater
management.45
A discussion of Texas groundwater law would be incomplete without discussing the landmark case of Edwards Aquifer Authority v.
Day, in which the Supreme Court of Texas drew sharp comparisons
between groundwater and oil and gas, finding that landowners have
absolute title in severalty to the groundwater under their land.46 The
court noted that both groundwater and oil and gas exist in subterranean reservoirs where they are fugacious.47 Accordingly, the court determined that groundwater and oil and gas should be treated similarly
with respect to ownership rights.48 Although the court acknowledged
that the considerations shaping the regulatory schemes of hydrocarbons and groundwater are fundamentally different, it rejected the argument that groundwater cannot be treated like oil and gas with
respect to ownership.49 As a result, the court directly applied the law
regarding ownership of oil and gas to groundwater.50 The court found
that landowners are “regarded as having absolute title in severalty to
the [groundwater] in place beneath [their] land,”51 and it reaffirmed
that the rule of capture is the only qualification on such ownership.52
However, as in Sipriano, the court found that although landowners
have absolute ownership of the groundwater under their land, the
rights to access and use that water can be restricted by regulations
imposed by GCDs.53

42. Id. at 77 (quoting City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798,
801 (Tex. 1955)).
43. Id. at 78 (citing Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21,
30 (Tex. 1978)).
44. Id. at 78 (quoting Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633 (Tex. 1996)).
45. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79.
46. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. 2012).
47. Id. at 829.
48. Id. at 829–30.
49. Id. at 831.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948)).
52. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 832.
53. See id. at 833–36.
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2. Groundwater Conservation Districts
The Texas Constitution was amended in 1917 to place the duty of
preserving the state’s natural resources, including groundwater, on the
legislature.54 To conserve the state’s groundwater, the legislature established GCDs as “the state’s preferred method of groundwater
management.”55 There are three ways that a GCD can be created: (1)
through legislative action; (2) through landowner petition; or (3)
through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s
(“TCEQ”) “own motion in a designated Priority Groundwater Management Area (“PGMA”).”56 Once a GCD is created, TCEQ appoints temporary directors to manage the district and establish
election procedures for future directors.57 Alternatively, territory can
be added to an existing district that is willing to accept new territory.58
“Entire counties can petition a GCD’s board for inclusion,” after
which the board conducts hearings and determines whether the territory will be included.59 GCDs are granted broad rulemaking authority
to conserve and prevent groundwater waste.60 There are three primary duties the districts are tasked with in managing groundwater resources: (1) accepting or denying well permits upon request; (2)
establishing a management plan for the district’s groundwater; and (3)
adopting rules necessary to effectuate the management plan.61 In order to highlight the possible regulations GCDs can impose, and to
provide an example of how unregulated areas in Texas can control the
excessive pumping currently taking place, it will be useful to present
certain provisions of the Reeves County GCD Management Plan, the
most recently established GCD in the state.62 Additionally, a large
portion of the Pecos Valley aquifer, the groundwater at issue, is located in Reeves County.63
Applicants seeking to establish wells in the Reeves County GCD
must provide a detailed statement including “[t]he nature and purpose
of the proposed use including the amount of water to be used for each
54. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1
S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tex. 1999).
55. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015(b).
56. What Is a Groundwater Conservation District? , TEX. COMMISSION ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, https://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/permitting/watersupply/ground
water/maps/gcd_text.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7KTR-C6AQ].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101.
61. What Is a Groundwater Conservation District? , supra note 56.
62. GCD Map, supra note 8.
63. Reeves County Groundwater Conservation District Management Plan, REEVES
COUNTY 25 (Aug. 1, 2018), http://www.reevescountygcd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
06/Management-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/C698-5SYN].
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purpose” and “conservation practices in effect or proposed.”64 Additionally, the application must include “a water conservation plan or a
declaration that the applicant will comply with the District’s management plan” and “[a] statement of the projected effect of the proposed
withdrawal on the aquifer or aquifer conditions, depletions, subsidence, or effects on existing permit holders or other groundwater
users in the District.”65 Applicants must also request a certain
pumpage volume and provide an estimated pumping rate.66
The Reeves Plan contains even more stringent requirements on
water that is to be transported out of the District.67 Applications to
transfer groundwater outside of the District’s boundaries require an
additional application fee, and the transfers are subject to export
fees.68 In determining whether to grant a transfer application, the District may consider whether the proposed transfer will have a negative
effect on the availability of water in the District, aquifer conditions
and levels, existing permit holders or other groundwater users within
the District, or any approved management plans.69 If it is determined
that the proposed well will have any such negative effect, the permit
can be limited or denied.70
B. New Mexico Groundwater Law
While Texas treats its groundwater as a private property right allocated to the surface owner,71 all water in New Mexico is owned by the
state.72 The state has the right to prescribe how water, whether above
or below the surface, may be used, with beneficial use as the basis for
determining the rights and limitations of appropriation.73 A right to
use groundwater can be obtained by filing an application with the
State Engineer.74 The application requires applicants to identify their
intended operations with some specificity, including the particular underground reservoir from which the water will be apportioned, the
beneficial use intended, and the amount of water applied for.75 An
64. Rules of the Reeves County Groundwater Conservation District, REEVES
COUNTY 13–14 (Sept. 1, 2019), http://www.reevescountygcd.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/08/Reeves-County-GCD-Rules-Final-August-8-2019-Effective-Sep-1-2019-01191
337x7A30F.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL6C-VWGX] [hereinafter Reeves Rules].
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id. at 14–15.
67. See id. at 32–34.
68. Id. at 32–33.
69. Id. at 33.
70. Reeves Rules, supra note 64, at 33.
71. Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 25.
72. JAMES C. BROCKMANN, OVERVIEW OF NEW MEXICO’S GROUNDWATER CODE
1 (2009), http://pg-tim.com/files/NM_Groundwater_Paper_JBrockmann.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PK2D-U3ZV].
73. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983, 987 (N.M. 1957).
74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (2019).
75. Id.
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application is granted if “there is unappropriated groundwater available” or if “the proposed new appropriation will not impair existing
water rights,” but only if “granting the application will not be contrary
to the conservation of water within the State, and if granting the application will not be detrimental to the public welfare of the State.”76
While what constitutes impairment to an existing water right has not
been defined through statute, the courts have highlighted some factors
to consider in analyzing impairment.77 These factors include “the incremental drawdown that would result . . . [and] the ability of the
water right owner to continue to use the well.”78 The State Engineer
also ensures that the proposed appropriation will not impair existing
surface water rights.79 Generally, a proposed appropriation that will
have an effect on hydrologically connected surface water will be
denied.80
III. WHAT REGULATION CAN NEW MEXICO IMPOSE
GROUNDWATER IMPORTS?

TO

REDUCE

In the event Texas fails to regulate the excessive pumping and interstate transfer of water, New Mexico officials and lawmakers might
wonder if something can be done on their end to stop or lessen the
practice. This Section focuses on two possibilities as to New Mexico’s
power to influence the pumping in Texas, given that it cannot regulate
such pumping directly. The first possibility is the regulation of water
importation, either by blocking all water imports or by regulating the
amount that will be accepted into the state. However, as such regulation would place a restriction on interstate commerce in “the most
direct manner possible,” New Mexico would be required to show that
there is no less-discriminatory means of protecting against excessive
pumping and aquifer depletion.81 In addition, New Mexico would
have to clearly show that the regulation serves a legitimate local purpose which is not grounded in economic protectionism or isolation.82
Rather, New Mexico must show that the regulation serves to prevent
harm to its natural resources that cannot be prevented through other
means.83 Alternatively, in order to avoid the strict scrutiny imposed
on facial discrimination of interstate commerce,84 New Mexico could
attempt to dissuade the pumping and transfer of water from Texas by
imposing regulations on the usage of water pumped from the Pecos
Valley aquifer in connection with oil wells in the state. Such a regula76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.; BROCKMANN, supra note 72, at 4.
BROCKMANN, supra note 72, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 143 (1986).
Id. at 148.
See id. at 151.
See id. at 138.
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tion would be imposed on all water that was pumped from the Pecos
Valley aquifer, regardless of whether it was pumped in Texas or New
Mexico. As a result, the regulation would be even-handed, and the
burden imposed on interstate commerce would be incidental. Such a
regulation would likely be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce was excessive in relation to the local benefits, or the
local interest involved could be promoted through other means that
place less of a burden on interstate activities.85 This Section explores
both of these possible regulations, what they might look like, and their
likelihood of being upheld if challenged.
A. Regulating Groundwater Imports
Restricting the amount of water imported from Texas would dissuade the excessive pumping in Texas. The incentive to pump excessively in Texas is the market available for the groundwater’s use in
New Mexico; therefore, a restriction on that market would likely result in less production.86 However, such a direct manner of regulating
commerce is subject to strict scrutiny and is only available when there
is a legitimate local purpose, not based in economic protectionism,
that cannot be resolved through other less-discriminatory means.87
Accordingly, if New Mexico were to restrict water imports from
Texas, and the restriction was challenged, New Mexico’s best argument would be to analogize the restriction to the statute at issue in
Maine v. Taylor, which prohibited the importation of live baitfish into
Maine.88
In Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court found that Maine had legitimate local reasons for prohibiting the importation of live baitfish that
“could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”89 In order to protect the state’s fisheries from parasites and
other species that might be included in shipments of live baitfish,
Maine enacted a statute that prohibited importing live baitfish into
the state.90 The statute was challenged as an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce.91 The Court found that although the statute
restricted interstate commerce in the “most direct manner possible,”
direct restriction alone is not enough to render a statute unconstitutional.92 While the states’ regulatory powers are limited by the Com85. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
86. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (discussing how the government can effectively regulate price by regulating the market. Just as the government can maintain a price by limiting production, it could effectively regulate
production by removing the economic incentive to produce.).
87. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137, 143, 148.
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 151–52.
90. Id. at 132–33.
91. Id. at 133.
92. Id. at 137–38.
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merce Clause, such limitation is not absolute.93 States retain
regulatory authority under their police powers to regulate matters of
local concern, even if doing so places a burden on interstate commerce.94 The Supreme Court has distinguished between statutes that
only incidentally burden interstate commerce and those that affirmatively discriminate against interstate transactions.95 If a statute is
found to discriminate against interstate commerce on its face, then the
state must demonstrate that it serves a legitimate local purpose which
cannot be served by other, nondiscriminatory means.96
The Court found that the Maine statute discriminated against interstate trade on its face, and thus Maine had the burden of showing that
prohibiting baitfish imports served a legitimate local purpose that
could not be accomplished through other, nondiscriminatory means.97
Experts for Maine testified that live baitfish imported into Maine
would place Maine’s wild fish population at risk by parasites common
in out-of-state baitfish but not present in Maine’s wild fish.98 In addition, the experts testified that non-native species included in shipments of live baitfish could disrupt Maine’s aquatic ecosystem, as such
species would prey on native species or compete with them for food or
habitat.99 Lastly, the experts testified that there was “no satisfactory
way to inspect shipments of live baitfish for parasites or commingled
species,” making prohibition on imports the only means of
prevention.100
Although there was “substantial scientific uncertainty” concerning
the environmental risks associated with the importation of live
baitfish, the Court found that Maine had a legitimate interest in
guarding against such risks, despite an imperfect understanding of the
risks and “the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible.”101 Moreover, the Court held the Commerce Clause cannot be
interpreted as requiring states to remain inactive until environmental
damage occurs or the scientific community agrees as to the risk.102
While the Commerce Clause significantly limits the states’ ability to
regulate interstate commerce, the Court found that the limitation is
not put before all other values.103 Rather, a state retains “broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
integrity of its natural resources.”104 As a result, the Court held
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
See id. at 138–39.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
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Maine’s prohibition on live baitfish imports was implemented to serve
“legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by
available nondiscriminatory alternatives” and, thus, the prohibition
was not unconstitutional.105
New Mexico has a legitimate local interest in conserving its water
source for when it will be most needed. While droughts generally have
a greater impact on surface water than groundwater, a drought causes
an increased water demand for irrigation.106 In times of severe
drought, increased pumping to support irrigation needs can cause a
substantial drop in the water level of an aquifer.107 This drop occurs as
a result of pumpage overdrafts in which water is pumped from the
aquifer at a higher rate than the rate at which the aquifer is recharged
through rainfall.108 It follows that such drops are sustainable through a
period of drought if the water level remains at its typical level through
periods of non-drought. However, intensive hydraulic fracturing operations like those in southern New Mexico can have large, localized
impacts on an aquifer’s water level, with declines of around 100 to 200
feet.109 In comparison, the irrigation demand for groundwater in the
severe drought of the 1950s caused the Pecos Valley aquifer’s level to
drop roughly 100 feet.110 Hydraulic fracturing operations can cause a
local decline in the water level similar to the severe decline which results from the irrigation demand in a period of drought. As a result, a
period of drought following such intensive operations could result in
disaster for certain regions, with inadequate water supply to provide
for an increased demand in irrigation. In other words, permit holders
for irrigation pumping could be left high and dry.
The interest in protecting the availability of water, aquifer levels,
and existing permit holders or other groundwater users is one that
Texas must agree with, given that interest is stated in GCD management plans across the state.111 Although there is not concrete evidence that the excessive pumping in Texas has or will cause a drop in
the water level under New Mexico, there might be enough evidence to
indicate that it is a possibility.112 As such, similar to the circumstances
in Maine v. Taylor, although there is substantial scientific uncertainty
regarding the effects of excessive pumping for hydraulic fracturing, a
court might find that New Mexico has a legitimate interest in guarding
105. Id. at 151–52.
106. Scanlon et al., supra note 11, at 7.
107. See JOHN B. ASHWORTH, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD, EVALUATION OF
GROUND-WATER RESOURCES IN PARTS OF LOVING, PECOS, REEVES, WARD, AND
WINKLER COUNTIES, TEXAS 19, 23 (1990), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/re
ports/numbered_reports/doc/R317/R317.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCL4-W687].
108. Id. at 23.
109. Scanlon et al., supra note 11, at 12.
110. See ASHWORTH, supra note 107, at 19.
111. See, e.g., Reeves Rules, supra note 64.
112. See Kondash et al., supra note 10.
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against the potential effects, despite an imperfect understanding of the
risks and “the possibility that they may ultimately prove to be
negligible.”113
Just as the Court in Maine v. Taylor held that the state of Maine had
“broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources,” the state of New Mexico has equal regulatory authority.114 If a court determines that this
authority extends to New Mexico safeguarding its groundwater to prevent possible scarcity in the event of a drought—even if that scarcity is
uncertain—then New Mexico might be able to place limited restrictions on the importation of groundwater from Texas without violating
the Commerce Clause. While such regulation would have a direct effect on the Texas water market, New Mexico has a substantial interest
in protecting its own water supply, which happens to be the same supply that Texas producers use. No additional regulation on pumping in
New Mexico is going to offset the excessive pumping in Texas. Therefore, if Texas refuses to impose its own regulations, then New Mexico’s only option is to dissuade excessive pumping by manipulating the
market.
B. Regulating Groundwater Usage
Any attempt to directly discriminate against interstate commerce is
met with the strictest scrutiny,115 whereas regulation that imposes a
burden on interstate commerce only incidentally is subject to less
scrutiny.116 Therefore, while direct discrimination might be upheld
under a Maine v. Taylor analogy, New Mexico might want to use lessdirect methods to better ensure its efforts are upheld. When the statute or regulation is imposed on both local and interstate activity
“even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”117 The extent of the burden
permitted depends “on the nature of the local interest involved” and
the availability of less-impactful alternatives.118 Therefore, if New
Mexico is able to construct a rule that effectively regulates groundwater usage from the Pecos Valley aquifer in connection with hydraulic fracturing operations in the state, then such a regulation would
impose a burden on groundwater that was pumped from the aquifer
regardless of whether such water was pumped in Texas or New Mexico. In determining what that regulation would look like, it is useful to
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
Id. at 151.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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examine the Supreme Court case of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., in which the Court found that a Minnesota statute banning
the retail sale of milk in plastic non-returnable, non-refillable containers was not unconstitutional despite the burdens it placed on interstate commerce.119
In 1977, Minnesota enacted a statute that banned retailers from selling milk in plastic non-returnable, non-refillable containers.120 However, sale in other non-returnable, non-refillable containers, such as
paperboard milk cartons, was still permitted.121 The legislature determined that the use of plastic containers “present[ed] a solid waste
management problem for the state, promote[d] energy waste, and deplete[d] natural resources.”122 Therefore, the statute forbid the retail
sale of milk in containers composed of at least 50 percent plastic.123
Respondents, composed of milk sellers and others in the industry,
challenged the statute as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.124 The district court concluded that the statute would not succeed in effecting its policy goal and found that, contrary to the
statute’s proclaimed purpose, the actual purpose of the statute was to
promote the economic interests of local dairy and pulpwood industries
over the interests of non-local industries.125 The Supreme Court stated
that even “[w]hen legislating in areas of legitimate local concern, such
as environmental protection and resource conservation, States are
nonetheless limited by the Commerce Clause.”126 Moreover, state
laws that purport to promote environmental protection and conservation but are, in reality, instances of economic protectionism, are generally held to be invalid.127 While statutes that regulate even-handedly
and only impose incidental burdens on interstate commerce are not
per se invalid, such statutes can still be found invalid if “the burden
imposed . . . is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”128 The extent of the burden permitted is dependent on “the nature of the local interest” and the availability of alternatives that
would have “a lesser impact on interstate activities.”129
The Court found the Minnesota statute was not merely economic
protectionism, but rather, the statute regulated even-handedly by
prohibiting the retail sale of milk in plastic containers regardless of
whether the retailers, the milk, or the containers were from outside of
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471–74 (1981).
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
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Id. at 471.
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the state.130 As the statute did not discriminate between interstate and
intrastate commerce, the Court had to determine whether it imposed
an incidental burden on interstate commerce that was excessive in relation to the local benefits.131 The Court found the burden imposed by
the Minnesota statute was relatively minor because milk could still
freely move across state lines and most dairies packed their products
in a variety of packages, making conformation to particular packaging
requirements only a slight inconvenience.132 While the statute would
cause producers to switch from manufacturers of plastic containers to
manufacturers of paperboard cartons, there was no indication that the
manufacturers positioned to gain from the switch would be Minnesota
firms, or that the manufacturers negatively affected would be from
outside the state.133 The Court held that even if it was shown “that the
out-of-state plastics industry [was] burdened relatively more heavily
than the Minnesota pulpwood industry,” such a burden would not be
“clearly excessive” given the substantial local interest in promoting
the conservation of natural resources.134 In addition, the Court found
all proposed alternatives were either more burdensome or less likely
to be effective, making the prohibition on plastic containers the only
available regulation.135 As nondiscriminatory regulations serving a
substantial local interest are not invalid simply because they cause
some economic benefit to shift from out-of-state industry to in-state
industry, the Court upheld the Minnesota statute because the local
interest outweighed the burden placed on interstate commerce.136
New Mexico could potentially establish regulations in connection
with oil well permits, which would impose restrictions on the amount
of Pecos Valley aquifer water that could be used in hydraulic fracturing operations. Such a regulation would be imposed even-handedly
because it would apply equally to water pumped in New Mexico and
Texas. As such, the regulation would be subject to less scrutiny. Given
the facts in Clover Leaf Creamery, it could be argued that although
such a regulation would have the effect of shifting business away from
Texas, or at least reducing such business in Texas, there is no indication that the economic benefit would shift to New Mexico. As the local interest outweighs the incidental effect that would be placed on the
Texas water market, if a restriction on groundwater usage rather than
imports is possible, it has a better chance of being upheld.
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C. The Likelihood of Successful Regulation
It is important to note that while this argument is possible, its effectiveness is shrouded in uncertainty given that it is based on a lack of
evidence. Under both methods of regulation, New Mexico will be required to show that it has a legitimate local interest in protecting its
natural resources from hydraulic fracturing operations in Texas.137
However, the evidence that is available could be used to support a
counterargument to New Mexico’s claim that regulation is necessary
to protect its natural resources.
In the Scanlon study—the most prominent study to date with respect to the effects of hydraulic fracturing operations on groundwater
availability138—the authors indicated that hydraulic fracturing operations can have large, localized impacts on water availability, whereas
the regional impact of such operations is small.139 Therefore, while
there is a remote possibility that New Mexico’s water availability
could be substantially affected by operations in Texas, it is more likely
that such operations would only have an effect, if any, in those areas
in Texas where the pumping actually occurred.140 As a result, it is uncertain whether a court would uphold a New Mexico regulation on
imports under the Maine v. Taylor principle—that the health and
safety of a state’s citizens and the integrity of its natural resources
trump substantial scientific uncertainty141—or if that court would find
that there is enough scientific certainty to show that New Mexico does
not have legitimate local interests to qualify its regulations. Therefore,
if New Mexico believes its interests are legitimate, it should turn to a
compact to ensure those interests are adequately met.
IV. ADDRESSING

THE

ISSUE THROUGH INTERSTATE COMPACT

Texas and New Mexico are currently litigating a separate issue concerning the Rio Grande Compact of 1938.142 The Compact requires
New Mexico to deliver a specified amount of water to the Elephant
Butte Reservoir annually.143 Texas then receives a specified amount of
water from the federal government through a separate agreement.144
Texas claims that New Mexico is permitting users downstream of the
Reservoir to divert water before it reaches the Texas state line.145 New
Mexico has taken the position that the Compact does not require New
Mexico to guarantee that a certain amount of water reaches the Texas
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
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state line or to prevent downstream diversion.146 Rather, New Mexico
argues that its only duty under the Compact is to deliver the specified
amount of water to the reservoir.147 In response, Texas contends that
the obligation to deliver the specified amount of water to the reservoir
would be meaningless if New Mexico was then permitted to recapture
that water before it reached Texas.148
In essence, Texas’s interests ultimately hinge on a Supreme Court
decision, the same remedy with which New Mexico would be left if
Texas were to not regulate its pumping. As a result, Texas might be
inclined to ensure its interests are met by regulating water exports
from Texas into New Mexico in exchange for a modification of the
Rio Grande Compact. Such a modification could include more concrete language that requires a certain amount of water be delivered to
the Texas state line. This would remove the ambiguity which permits
New Mexico to argue that it has no such duty. In exchange, Texas
could regulate the frequency and amount of groundwater exports into
New Mexico. As a result, New Mexico will receive both the assurance
that its natural resources are protected and the potential for economic
benefit if companies begin to pump from the aquifer in New Mexico.149 However, in regulating groundwater exports, Texas will likely
be required to overcome constitutional challenges made under the
Commerce Clause. Therefore, the remainder of this Section discusses
the potential issues Texas might face and how to impose regulations
that will withstand such challenges.
A. Potential Issues with Federal Commerce Power in Regulating
Groundwater Exports
Somewhat ironically, New Mexico has attempted to restrict the
transfer of its groundwater into Texas by imposing an outright ban on
interstate transfers.150 The ban, in pertinent part, read: “No person
shall withdraw water from any underground source in New Mexico for
use in any other state . . . .”151 While such a ban would certainly resolve the issues New Mexico currently faces, in City of El Paso ex rel.
Public Service Board v. Reynolds, the United States District Court for
146. First Interim Report of the Special Master On New Mexico’s Motion To Dismiss Texas’s Complaint And The United States’ Complaint In Intervention And Motions Of Elephant Butte Irrigation District And El Paso County Water Improvement
District No. 1 For Leave To Intervene at 188, Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954
(2018) (No. 141) [https://perma.cc/HCA3-3E27].
147. Id.
148. Id. at 190.
149. See Weiser, supra note 4 (discussing the economic benefits New Mexico is not
receiving as a result of companies importing from Texas rather than pumping in New
Mexico).
150. City of El Paso ex rel. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 381
(D.N.M. 1983).
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978) (repealed Feb. 22, 1983); Reynolds, 563 F.
Supp. at 381 n.2.

2020]

SUBSURFACE TENSION

471

the District of New Mexico held that outright bans on out-of-state
groundwater transfers, like the one the New Mexico legislature had
enacted, are unconstitutional as “explicit barrier[s] to interstate commerce.”152 The court found that, as a whole, New Mexico’s regulation
of its groundwater was both important and legitimate, and that “limited, non-discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce” through
such regulation can be justified.153 However, the court highlighted the
distinction between regulation for the purpose of benefiting the health
and safety of the state’s citizens and regulation that is grounded in
economic protectionism.154 It found that a state does not have the
power to “burden or constrict the flow of . . . commerce for [its] economic advantage . . . .”155 Therefore, while a state may not ban the
transfer of its groundwater to other states outright, it can regulate interstate transfers by “impos[ing] the same withdrawal and use restrictions on out-of-state users as it does on its own citizens.”156 As a
result, pumping for interstate transfer will be subject to permit requirements, and such permits can be terminated if the pumping does
not conform to the standards required for all permits in the state.157
The holding that interstate transfer of groundwater may be regulated if the regulation is identical to the regulations imposed on pumping groundwater for in-state use was reiterated in Ponderosa Ridge
LLC v. Banner County.158 Ponderosa Ridge LLC (“Ponderosa”), a
Nebraska company, was denied a permit to transfer groundwater to
Wyoming from a well in Nebraska.159 Despite finding that Ponderosa’s intended use was beneficial, the director of the Department of
Water Resources determined that there was sufficient supply in Wyoming for Ponderosa’s needs.160 In response, Ponderosa contended the
guiding statute discriminated against interstate commerce.161 The statute, in pertinent part, reads: “Any person . . . or other entity intending
to withdraw ground water from any water well located in the State of
Nebraska and transport it for use in another state shall apply . . . for a
permit to do so.”162 The statute then identifies factors that the director
shall consider in determining whether to grant the permit, including
the beneficial use of the groundwater, the availability of alternative
152. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. at 388.
153. Id. at 389.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting H.P. Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)).
156. Id. at 390 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 952
(1982)).
157. Id.
158. Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, 554 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 1996).
159. Id. at 155.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 156.
162. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-613.01 (LexisNexis 1993); Ponderosa, 554 N.W.2d
at 156.

472

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

sources, the negative effects of the proposed withdrawal, and any
other factors deemed relevant.163
The court found that, although Congress has the power to regulate
water as an article of commerce, a state is not foreclosed from regulating its water in the absence of federal regulation.164 A state may regulate interstate commerce in water if the statute “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental.”165 Therefore, the regulation may burden interstate commerce if it serves a legitimate local
interest and places no greater burden on interstate commerce than
intrastate commerce.166 The court found the Nebraska statute, while
operating specifically on interstate transfers, was not discriminating
against interstate commerce when “severe withdrawal and use restrictions” were imposed on intrastate transfers as well.167 The court further held that “measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve
[groundwater] for its own citizens . . . in times of severe shortage” are
reasonable with respect to its police power.168
While there is no concrete rule as to the extent that a state may
prefer its own citizens, the court highlighted some guidelines that have
been applied consistently, including the principle that regulations
grounded in economic protectionism are invalid per se.169 However,
when economic interests are merely implicated as a consequence of a
state preferring its own citizens on the basis of public welfare, “the
Court must try to accommodate the competing local and national interests.”170 While the “public welfare” of its citizens is not limited only
to their survival and includes many interests, including economic interests, a state “may not require interstate commerce to shoulder the
entire burden of furthering those interests.”171 If domestic wells result
in the same detrimental impact as interstate transfers, a state may not
deny interstate transfers while permitting detrimental domestic wells
because regulating all wells even-handedly would likely be an equally
effective alternative that would be less burdensome on interstate

163. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-613.01; Ponderosa, 554 N.W.2d at 156–57.
164. Ponderosa, 554 N.W.2d at 159 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982)).
165. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 160 (quoting Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 955–56
(1982)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 161–62.
170. Id. at 162 (quoting City of El Paso, ex rel. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 597 F.
Supp. 694, 702 (D.N.M. 1984)).
171. Id. at 162–63 (quoting City of El Paso, ex rel. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 597
F. Supp. at 704).
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commerce.172 When such alternatives exist, “the [s]tate must use
them.”173
B. How Texas Can Impose Regulations
In order to impose regulations on groundwater usage, GCDs must
be created in unregulated areas, as GCDs are the chosen form of
groundwater regulation in Texas.174 As landowners in these presently
unregulated areas do not have any incentive to petition for the creation of a GCD,175 the GCD would likely need to be created through
legislative action.176 Once a GCD is created, management plans could
be adopted in the areas that would address the excessive interstate
groundwater transfers.
However, the management plans adopted must address the interstate transfer of water without placing a substantial burden on interstate commerce. This can be done by either making the regulations for
interstate and intrastate transfers identical or by enacting interstate
regulations that do not require interstate transfers to suffer any
greater burden than intrastate transfers.177 As it is unclear what would
constitute a greater burden on interstate transfers if the regulations
are not identical, the safest method is to adopt regulations that are
identical for both interstate and intrastate transfers. This can easily be
done by following the Reeves example, which imposes more stringent
requirements and additional fees on applications to transfer groundwater out of the district. Such regulations apply to both district exports to other areas within the state and to exports that are
transferred to other states. Therefore, a plan modeled after the
Reeves example would even-handedly impose burdens on both intrastate and interstate transfers and would likely be upheld, as evenhanded regulation prevents interstate activity from “shoulder[ing] the
entire burden” in effectuating a local purpose.178 While the regulations would be identical, it would likely have a far greater effect on
interstate transfers, essentially closing the “loophole” of freely transferring groundwater from unregulated areas in Texas to highly regulated areas in New Mexico.
172. See id. at 162–63.
173. Id. at 162 (quoting City of El Paso, ex rel. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 597 F.
Supp. at 701).
174. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015(b).
175. See Weiser, supra note 4 (landowners are profiting from the lack of regulation
and, thus, would likely not create a GCD, as its restrictions are adverse to the landowner’s economic interests).
176. See generally TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59 (discussing the legislative requirements for the creation of a GCD).
177. See Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, 554 N.W.2d 151, 160 (Neb.
1996).
178. City of El Paso, ex rel. Pub. Serv. Bd. v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. at 704.
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While such regulation may not deter the practice of pumping
groundwater in Texas for transfer to New Mexico, because of the
greater availability of groundwater in Texas, it would at least reduce
the scope of such operations and the current concentration of those
operations in unregulated areas. It might also cause some pumping to
move into New Mexico for convenience, which would result in an economic benefit for New Mexico.
V. CONCLUSION
If New Mexico imposed regulations on the importation of Texas
groundwater or on the amount of water used from the Pecos Valley
aquifer in connection with New Mexico oil wells, it would have to
show that the regulations did not overly restrict the flow of commerce
between the two states.179 While New Mexico might be able to succeed in defending such regulations, the legal battle that would surely
result would be long, costly, and damaging to state relations. A more
efficient process would be one of diplomacy in the form of an interstate compact between Texas and New Mexico. While Texas seemingly
has no incentive to restrict the flow of its groundwater into New Mexico, it might be enticed to do so through a reciprocal promise, such as
a modification of the Rio Grande Compact. It seems that Texas would
be interested in a modification of that compact in order to ensure the
security of its natural resources. In examining New Mexico’s complaint regarding excessive pumping and importation, the two states
appear to share similar concerns over different issues. A modification
of the Rio Grande Compact to meet Texas’s needs, and the creation of
a new compact to address New Mexico’s concerns would effectively
end the costly, ongoing litigation and prevent additional litigation in
the future.
179. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1980); Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138–39 (1986).

